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1 Introduction1 
In 1935 legal philosopher Huntington Cairns stated that: 
It is the contemporary belief, in American legal circles at all events, that law or 
jurisprudence, whatever it may have been in the past, has now the status of a 
social science. This is an assumption easier to make than to substantiate and in 
view of the increasing insistence upon this point, it is now appropriate to inquire 
whether or not it possesses a tangible foundation.2 
This sentiment, expressed in 1935, still applies. In 2002 an American legal journal 
published an article where the question was rephrased into whether – or when – a 
Nobel Prize in "legal science" would be awarded.3 Apart from the possible eligibility 
for accolades, the question of whether or not law is science is important to lawyers4 
for two reasons. In the first instance South African legislation defines science5 but 
the courts have never been asked to interpret the relevant statutory provisions – it is 
quite conceivable that a court of law may have to address the question at some 
stage. In the second instance, scholarship requires reflection upon the nature of 
one's activities, which includes the question of whether or not our discipline, law, is 
science or scientific.  Recently the question was contemplated by Kroeze as part of 
broader consideration of what interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and trans-
disciplinary research entails.6 This article attempts to contribute to the debate from a 
South African legal and philosophical perspective and approaches the question from 
an angle different from Kroeze's. 
*  Rolien MC Roos. BCom LLB (PU for CHE), LLM (RAU), MPhil (NWU). Senior Lecturer, Faculty of 
Law, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University. Email: Rolien.Roos@nwu.ac.za 
1  This manuscript was completed in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MPhil at 
the NWU. The author wishes to thank Professor Renato Coletto for his invaluable guidance and 
assistance. 
2  Cairns 1935 Philosophy of Science 484. 
3  Ulen 2002 U Ill L Rev 875. 
4  The term "lawyer" will be defined in s 5 of this article. It is used in its generic sense for the 
moment. 
5  See s 4 of this article. 
6  Kroeze 2013 PELJ 36-50. Incidentally, it is submitted that this article constitutes trans-disciplinary 
research – also see footnote 34. 
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In the current standard work prescribed for most first-year students in Introduction 
to Law, "law" is defined as the body of rules or regulations that facilitate and 
regulate human interaction, order society, create certainty and are applied, 
interpreted and enforced by state institutions.7 The authors of the textbook claim 
that law should reflect shared values. They state that "the law is a set of norms 
distinguishing good from bad. A norm is a rule regulating human conduct".8 Earlier 
authors also describe the law with reference to its ordering function. As people are 
capable of making choices, law as a normative phenomenon is typical of human 
society.9 Law is a product of custom, legislation and judicial development – it is a 
social ordering instrument that operates bottom-up as well as top-down.10 This 
composite description of law will be accepted for the purposes of this contribution.11 
In addition, lawyers often refer to their discipline as a science,12 but this premise 
should not be accepted uncritically. There are two issues at stake: the implicit 
7  Kleyn and Viljoen Beginner's Guide 2. 
8  Kleyn and Viljoen Beginner's Guide 3. 
9  Van Warmelo Regsleer, Regswetenskap, Regsfilosofie 29; Van Zyl and Van der Vyver Inleiding 1-
5. Post Introduction to the Law 2 asserts that law would be superfluous had "men lived in a state 
of complete isolation from each other" and that even the most primitive societies function 
subject to law. Although law should reflect justice, there is a distinction – law is a body of rules, 
justice is an ideal – Post Introduction to the Law 10, 17. 
10  For the present purposes the author accepts the explanation of Berman Law and Revolution 557 
that the Western concept of law is that it is both "part of the material base" and "part of the 
ideological superstructure", after he has suggested on 556 that each of the positivist theory of 
law (that it reflects the will of the lawmaker and can be used as an instrument of domination), 
the natural law view (that law is an expression of moral standards) and the social theory of law 
(that law is "an outgrowth of custom, a product of the historically rooted values and norms of 
the community) provides "one-third of the truth" regarding the nature of law. 
11  A detailed discussion of what law is does not form the focus of the present investigation. There 
are indeed many different approaches and views to defining the concept – see for example 
Berman and Greiner Nature and Functions of Law 16-37 and Post Introduction to the Law 7-17. 
Berman and Greiner Nature and Functions of Law 25-26 state: "The legal aspect of social order 
must be approached partly in terms of the particular moral principles which it embodies, partly in 
terms of the particular political authorities which shape it, and partly in terms of the particular 
historical experience and values which it expresses. Indeed, these are not three things but one 
thing viewed from three different angles." It is asserted that law should be defined in terms of its 
functions or objectives, not its origins or sanctions – Berman and Greiner Nature and Functions 
of Law 26; Post Introduction to the Law 7. Law exists to provide solutions when something goes 
wrong, when there are "actual or potential disruptions of patterns or norms of social behaviour" 
or conflict. It is there to resolve disputes; maintain social order; restore the social equilibrium; 
serve as a framework for establishing appropriate behaviour; regulate state, social or commercial 
action and mould the legal and moral attitudes of society – Berman and Greiner Nature and 
Functions of Law 27-28, 31-34; Post Introduction to the Law 4-5. 
12  The contemporary work of the Dutch author Jan Smits offers an excellent example. His main 
project is to define the purpose of legal research and his theory is that "the core of legal studies 
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assumption that a science is something that a discipline can be. The second is that 
the first typical answer offered to the question "is law a science?" is that law is 
indeed a science, as it is generally accepted as such. This assumption and "default" 
response will be analysed and be shown to offer inadequate theoretical justification 
for the conclusion reached. Other proposed demarcation criteria should therefore be 
examined. It is submitted that legal theory will benefit from and indeed requires the 
application of philosophical perspectives in order to answer the question: is law 
science?  
However, this exercise is not as unproblematic as one may suppose, as views on 
science and what science is have changed considerably over the ages. The 
demarcation criteria (ie "tests" or "standards" to determine whether a discipline 
amounts to "science") that have been proposed by different philosophers of science 
differ substantially.13 An analysis of the views that science is practised when the 
scientific method is used, that it can be falsified, that it amounts to puzzle-solving 
within a certain paradigm, that it renders beneficial results or that it involves 
abstraction and theorisation will be provided in section 3. The hypothesis is that the 
notion that science amounts to abstraction in a technical sense offers the best 
theoretical basis in the present context. On this basis, the statutory definitions of 
"science" and "research" in South Africa also require examination. This analysis is 
therefore an attempt to solve the central question in this article by allowing 
commentators on law, philosophers of science, philosophers of law and creators of 
law a say in the matter.14 
The emphasis on science as a type of activity (as opposed to a discipline) that can 
either be classified as science or not will be explored in section 5. The activities of 
law students, practitioners, academics and law-makers will be measured against the 
[is] the normative question of what law ought to be" (Smits 2014 Critical Analysis of Law 76). He 
departs from the assumption that law is a science by referring to "legal science" in the 
introductory phases of most of his publications or simply regarding it as such. See Smits 
"Redefining Normative Legal Science" 45, Smits 2012 http://elgarblog.wordpress.com/ 
2012/08/15/what-do-legal-academics-do. 
13  The 2400 year-long attempt to reach consensus on demarcation criteria has justly been classified 
as "not a very successful one" as there is still no general consensus on what the criteria are – 
Coletto 2013 TD 2.  
14  Coletto 2013 TD 1-2 as quoted in part in fn 34. 
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proposed demarcation criterion to establish which, if any, activities would amount to 
"science". 
However, to provide the requisite contextual background, the first point to consider 
is the traditional acceptance by lawyers that law is a science.  
2 Traditional acceptance that law is a science15 
Very few South African legal textbooks address the question of what legal or juridical 
science is, probably because its status as a science is assumed and elaboration is 
deemed unnecessary. Even in American textbooks, law is described as a science, 
albeit "an inexact science", without elaboration on the reasons for its being granted 
scientific status.16 
From the time of the earliest establishment of schools by the Romans, law formed 
part of the curriculum taught to free persons.17 When universities were established in 
Europe during the Middle Ages law was taught as a central discipline and law 
faculties were even regarded as facultates superiores, where a second degree could 
be obtained.18 In most countries this remains the case to the present day. In South 
Africa, as in most other countries, a university degree is required for admission to 
the legal professions.19 
In the United States of America, Christopher Columbus Langdell (1826-1906), Dean 
at Harvard Law School from 1870 to 1895, reformed the perceptions of law and legal 
education, and distinguished between law as a science and law as vocational legal 
15  Although reference will be made to theorists from different international origins, the practical 
application of theories to determine the status of law as (possible) science will focus on the 
South African context. 
16  Post Introduction to the Law 8. The Dutch example of Smits (see fn 12) has already been 
alluded to. 
17  Du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 5. 
18  Du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 7. The other "superior" faculties were Theology and Medicine. A 
student had to obtain a first degree from a subtilissima facultas (such as Arts). 
19  Currently a baccalaureus legum (LLB) or equivalent – Attorneys Act 53 of 1997 s 2(1); Admission 
of Advocates Act 74 of 1964 s 3(2)(a); Legal Practice Bill B20-2012 s 26(1)(a). Although legal 
subjects are taught at various other tertiary institutions, including training colleges and 
universities of technology, the qualifications conferred do not offer access to the professions. 
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training.20 The practice of the "science of law" would require that students distil the 
general and fundamental principles of law from decided cases, which are seen as the 
"dataset" of the science, by using inductive reasoning.21 
The legal principles so derived functioned as the constituent ontological units within 
the construct.  From them, through the rigorous and almost Cartesian application of 
logic and deductive reasoning, a series of clear specific rules would be derived that 
would govern any given case. The specific rules themselves were formalistic in 
conception, meaning that they were framed in a manner that made their application 
uncontroversial when applied to stipulated facts.  The rules would then be the bases 
of decision-making in future cases.22  
Langdell stated: 
If law not be a science, a university best consult its own dignity in declining to 
teach it. If it be not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may best be learned 
by serving an apprenticeship to one who practises.23 
His distinction between law as a handicraft and as a science may be tenuous, as his 
method of teaching law was the method used by practising lawyers.24 
Like Langdell, the influential South African Professor Paul Van Warmelo25 also came 
to the conclusion that the library is the legal scientist's "workshop",26 a view that is 
hardly disputed today. For Langdell scientific study meant using the original sources, 
i.e. cases, and not relying on someone else's interpretation thereof.27 He argued that 
law consists of doctrines and principles developed through the cases, often over 
centuries.28 
20  Garvin 2003 Harvard Magazine 56-58; http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/about/history/?redir=1. He 
also introduced the combined Socratic and case law method, now commonly used in law schools 
all over the world.  
21  Hamoudi 2007 Cornell Int'l LJ 98; Stevens Law School 56; Speziale 1980 Vt L Rev 1-3. 
22  Hamoudi 2007 Cornell Int'l LJ 98-99, footnotes omitted. 
23  As quoted by Stevens Law School 52. Speziale 1980 Vt L Rev 4 relates how apprenticships were 
the precursor to formal legal education in the USA. 
24  Speziale 1980 Vt L Rev 14-15. 
25  Van Warmelo Regsleer, Regswetenskap, Regsfilosofie 93. 
26  Stevens Law School 53; Speziale 1980 VLR 16. 
27  Speziale 1980 Vt L Rev 7-8. 
28  Langdell as quoted by Speziale 1980 Vt L Rev 12. 
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Law should be taught at universities, as "in the rest of the civilised world", and only 
universities could offer access to the required sources to study law as he proposed.29 
Unfortunately, Langdell never substantiated his argument with a definition of what 
science is and his own concept of science is unclear.30 
Langdell's sentiments are endorsed by the South African legal philosopher LM du 
Plessis when he observes that the twofold task of a university, to wit teaching and 
research, requires a critical and creative engagement with knowledge. He refers to 
Pauw, who likewise distinguishes between a university and a vocational school, on 
the basis that the latter focuses merely on training in techniques. A university, on 
the other hand, provides theoretical knowledge that will enable the student to react 
to unfamiliar situations and to offer creative solutions to problems.31 
This approach defines (legal) science with reference to what it is not and how it is 
practised. It is not a handicraft; neither is it the mere application of techniques. It is 
all about the distillation of principles through a process of reasoning and for this 
reason it is taught at university.32 This approach provides a basis for distinguishing 
between science and non-science in law, yet it is submitted that it is still rudimentary 
and needs further development. A child who is scolded after grabbing a sibling's toy, 
may also distil the principle(s) of accepted behaviour through reasoning, but that 
would not be regarded as a scientific activity by anyone. 
In addition, the idea is created that the scientific nature of law and the university as 
an institution are intertwined. It is true that development in many other disciplines is 
closely tied to universities and research institutions, but legal academics are not the 
sole creators of legal texts and, more importantly, they are not the (direct) authors 
of legal development. In South Africa, the unique Constitutional Assembly was 
responsible for this in the recent past, and legislatures and courts currently perform 
29  Langdell as quoted by Speziale 1980 Vt L Rev 14. 
30  Speziale 1980 Vt L Rev 13. 
31  Du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 11-12. 
32  The nature of universities and whether or not all subjects taught at universities amount to 
science is a debate that will not be entered into here.  
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this function.33 Therefore, the view of these two institutions on law and its possible 
scientific status should also be considered, as they form part of the voice of the 
discipline.34 It appears as if South African courts have made ample use of terms 
denoting law as science, but it should be established if any particular meaning was 
attached to the words used and if so, what it was. 
A search of the Juta law reports of South Africa yielded three results for the term 
"legal science". In one case the term appeared as part of a title of a source referred 
to in a footnote.35 In the other two cases the term appeared as part of a quotation 
by authors who assumed the status of law as science without elaboration.36 A search 
for "juridical science" resulted in four cases, but all four are references to articles 
published in the accredited journal titled "Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap / Journal for 
Juridical Science".37 A search for the term "law as science" yielded no results, while 
"science of law" was more fruitful, with a total of 11 reported and 8 unreported 
South African cases.38 However, in 1739 of these cases the reference was included as 
part of (an obviously often quoted) statement by the American Justice Sutherland in 
33  The influence of legal academics' efforts on legal development will be explored in s 5 of this 
article. 
34  Coletto 2013 TD 1-2: "…issues concerning scientific status, the paradigms, inter-disciplinary 
dialogue and so forth constitute a big question mark for many academics. This is not surprising: 
such issues cannot be solved from inside any particular discipline. On the one hand, issues of 
demarcation and classification of the sciences are typical philosophical tasks. On the other hand, 
as Stoker (1971:41) puts it, when it comes to such issues, all the parties involved should have a 
say. Philosophy should not try to impose decisions, but should listen to the other sciences. This 
topic might therefore be regarded as one inviting to transdisciplinary research ...." 
35  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) fn 17.  
36  Intercompany Security Services (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Transport & General Workers Union 1995 16 
ILJ 854 (LAC) 859I; Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co v MV Kalantiao 1987 4 SA 250 (D) 258D. 
37  Netshituka v Netshituka 2011 5 SA 453 (SCA) para 10, fn 5; Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 
(SCA) fn 4; Taylor v Kurtstag 2005 1 SA 362 (W) 377C-D; Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 
(Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights 
Commission v President of The Republic of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) fn 172.  
38  Juta also includes reportable judgements originating in Zimbabwe and Namibia. One 
Zimbabwean and three Namibian cases were also found.  
39  S v Nkambule 2011 JDR 0520 (GNP) para 41; S v Pitso 2002 2 SACR 686 (O) 593C-D; S v 
Mbambo 1999 2 SACR 421 (W) 426G-H; S v Maduna 1997 1 SA SACR 646 (T) 65 I-J; S v 
Philemon 1997 2 SACR 651 (W) 665B-C; Mgcina v Regional Magistrate, Lenasia 1997 2 SACR 
711 (W) 716E-F; Maduna v Die Streeklanddros T J La Grange (Klerksdorp) 1997 JDR 0337 (T) 7; 
S v Ramokone 1995 1 SACR 634 (O) 636H-I; S v Zulu 1990 1 SA 655 (T) 660H-I; Nakani v 
Attorney-General, Ciskei 1989 3 SA 655 (CK) 657B-C; S v Radebe; S v Mbonani 1988 1 SA 191 
(T) 195E-G; S v Khanyile 1988 3 SA 795 (N) 803H-J; S v Mabeti 2005 JDR 1031 (T) 3 para 5; S v 
Viljoen 2003 JDR 0104 (T) 21 para 30; S v Maake 2003 JDR 0848 (T) 6 para 5; S v Maema 2002 
JDR 0593 (T) 3 para 5; S v Masogo 2001 JDR 0582 (T) 4 para 5.  
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Powel v Alabama,40 which deals with an unrepresented accused's precarious position 
due to a lack of knowledge of the "science of law". The other two references41 
appeared in a quotation of the classic author Voet, discussing the personal liability of 
judges for incorrect judgements due to their lack of knowledge or skill. 
Although some reference to the "scientific status" of law can thus be found, in none 
of these cases was the legitimacy of regarding law as a science considered. 
Judges writing in Afrikaans seem fonder of the term "regswetenskap", as a search 
for this term yielded 25 South African judgements.42 In 10 of these the reference 
was to an article published in the "Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap / Journal for Juridical 
Science".43 In 7 of the cases the term is used as a synonym for law or the legal 
system,44 and in three cases "regswetenskap" is contrasted with legislation, without 
elaboration.45 In two cases the practice and science of law are referred to as 
40  Powel v Alabama 287 US 45 (1932) 68-69. 
41  Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority of South Africa 
2005 JDR 0985 (W) 11 para 7 and Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising 
Standards Authority of South Africa 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA) 470D-E. 
42  This may be as a result of the difference in approaches by traditionally English and Afrikaans 
universities as suggested by Kroeze 2013 PELJ 48. 
43  Northview Shopping Centre (Pty) Ltd v Revelas Properties Johannesburg CC 2010 3 SA 630 
(SCA) para 25 / fn 16; S v Damoyi 2004 1 SACR 121 (C) 126E; Sempapalele v Sempapalele 2001 
2 SA 306 (O) 310F-G; Erlax Properties (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds 1992 1 SA 879 (A) 881; 
Black v Barklays Zimbabawe Nominees (Pvt) Ltd 1990 1 SACR 433 (W) 434E-F; De Kock v 
Jacobson 1999 4 SA 346 (W) 348H; S v Adams 1986 4 SA 882 (A) 899H; Britz v Britz 2000 JDR 
0194 (SCA) 11 para 16; Olivier v Jonck BK h/a Bothaville Vleismark 1999 JDR 0068 (O) 12; Die 
Prokureursorde van die Oranje-Vrystaat v Schoeman 1977 4 SA 588 (O) 592A. 
44  Grobler v Naspers Bpk 2004 4 SA 220 (C) 286B refers to vicarious liability as a field of the 
"regswetenskap"; Van den Berg & Kie Rekenkundige Beamptes v Boomprops 1028 BK 1999 1 SA 
780 (T) 792G: developments in English law should not necessarily determine development in the 
South African "regswetenskap"; Rand Waterraad v Bothma 1997 3 SA 120 (O) 134D-E: some 
notions with Greek origin where received in Roman law; in Jubelius v Griesel 1988 2 SA SA 610 
(C) 624C-D the reference is to something that can be described as a title "in die regswetenskap"; 
Kahn v Volschenk 1986 3 SA 84 (A) 99H-I contains a translation of the classic author Van 
Bynkershoek who states that "daardie regswetenskap" would accommodate something; in S v 
Bailey 1982 3 SA 772 (A) 774D-E the state's counsel argued "die regswetenskap ken twee 
strafregtelike skuldbegrippe"; Nortje v Pool 1966 3 SA 96 (A) 115A-B refers to "Duitse en 
Italiaanse regswetenskap". 
45  In S v Mbele 1991 1 SA 307 (W) 309H-310B it was stated that an accused would not be guilty of 
a crime if he is not liable in terms of "die regswetenskap en selfs die 1988-Wet" (this statement 
was quoted with approval in S v Pietersen 1994 2 SACR 434 (C) 438D-G); Lean v Van der Mescht 
1972 2 SA 100 (O) 107G: a certain question was not even answered in Dutch "regswetenskap of 
wetgewing". 
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separate issues, but they are not defined or distinguished.46 In two other cases the 
reference is respectively to the title of a book and of a journal article.47 
The only judgement that offers some distinction between legal science and legal 
practice is that of Judge Mostert in Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films 
(Edms) Bpk,48 where the extensive development of the concept "subjective right" 
and its accompanying system by academics in their theses, articles and books are 
clearly categorised as legal science that can, according to the court, be beneficially 
applied in legal practice49 or law. 
As demonstrated above, South African courts accept a distinction between legal 
practice and legal science without attempting any definitions of legal science or law 
as science. The highest courts in the country, the Constitutional Court and Supreme 
Court of Appeal, have never been requested to or deemed it necessary to address 
the issue. 
The only statutory reference to law as a science is found in section 46 of the 
Attorneys Act,50 where grants by the Attorneys Fidelity Fund's Board of Control to 
universities for "education or research in the science of law or in legal practice" are 
permitted. None of the terms is defined, yet it is clear that the distinction made 
above is accepted. 
It is submitted that the distinction which the courts and legislature make between 
law as science and law as practice echoes the distinction referred to earlier, between 
legal education as "scientific" and university based, versus "vocational" training, 
which is focused on techniques.51 Nonetheless, this distinction made by academics 
and courts does not provide a satisfactory answer to the questions of what a science 
is and why law should be regarded as such. The assistance of the theories 
46  S v Chavulla 1999 1 SACR 39 (C) 46I-J: certain rules have crystallised over the years in both 
legal science and legal practice; Moeketsi v Mininster van Justisie 1988 4 SA 707 (T) 714A. 
47  Mota v Moloantoa 1984 4 SA 761 (O) 801F-G, 806F-G; S v Collop 1981 1 SA 150 (A) 155C. 
48  Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 SA 376 (T) 381-383. 
49  The Afrikaans judgement refers to "praktiese hantering van regsprobleme". Universiteit van 
Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 SA 376 (T) 381-383. 
50  Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. 
51  This distinction is rudimentary and should not be accepted without qualification. Refer to s 6 of 
this article. 
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developed by philosophers of science should therefore be elicited to provide a sound 
theoretical framework to formulate a demarcation criterion, as this kind of question 
is a typical (though not exclusively) philosophical project.52  
3 Theoretical exploration 
3.1 Science uses the scientific method 
By the late 19th century positivism had become the most influential movement in 
Western philosophy of science. Its main tenet is that the only reliable knowledge is 
scientific knowledge resulting from empirical data derived from experience. Scientific 
knowledge is based on sense-experience and science is the description and 
explanation of empirical facts. The content of science is therefore positive facts, 
established by the scientific method.53 
For Auguste Comte (1794-1859), the father of positivist philosophy, the third and 
highest stage of human development is the positive phase, where all superstition 
(religion included) and metaphysics are abandoned and (empirical) science rules.54 
For him, the main aims of science are prediction and explanation of phenomena.55 
He distinguishes between meaning and demarcation, but it seems as if he conflated 
these concepts. In his view, science is predictive (denoting meaning) and verifiable 
(demarcation); and metaphysics cannot be scientific as it is neither predictive nor 
verifiable. Isolated facts that do not form part of a system are verifiable but non-
predictive, and are thus not scientific.56  
The view that science could provide irrefutable and objective answers to problems 
and that it is indeed the only defensible path to the truth became the norm in 
52  Coletto 2013 TD 1, Kroeze 2013 PELJ 37. 
53  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 1; Strauss 2004 
JNGS 58. 
54  Mautner Dictionary of Philosophy 114, 482; Speziale 1980 Vt L Rev 2. 
55  Laudan 1971 Philosophy of Science 36, 37.  
56  Laudan 1971 Philosophy of Science 40-41. Comte required "a systematicity and a generality" for 
"genuine scientific systems", Laudan 1971 Philosophy of Science 40. Later in life Comte included 
sociology and ethics in his list of sciences, but not disciplines like law or history - Coletto 2011 
Journal for Christian Scholarship 65; Coletto 2013 Koers 2. 
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Western thought.57 This view obviously did not accommodate any discipline that did 
not use the "scientific method" – natural sciences that were developed using 
experiments and empirically verifiable data provided the model to be emulated. 
Although this view is still prevalent in some circles even today, there has been a 
dramatic shift from this position in the twentieth century.58 Karl Popper was among 
the first philosophers of science to move away from the position that science is an 
exact, objective and purely value free enterprise that comprises observations and 
inductive reasoning.  
3.2  Science is susceptible to falsification  
Karl Popper (1902-1994) states that metaphysical beliefs, the scientist's "horizon of 
expectations"59 and scientific hypotheses influence science – a move away from the 
positivists' and empiricists' contention that objective empirical facts are obtainable by 
using the "scientific method" of observation and verification. Popper himself 
emphasises observation, but adds that it "is always preceded by a particular interest, 
a question or a problem – in short, by something theoretical".60 A problem is 
identified and a hypothesis is formed and only then does the planned observation 
take place. After this a theory is formulated and accepted, as long as it is not 
falsified.61  
For Popper, science is the activity of problem-solving with a critical attitude.62 His 
approach to problems in science has been likened to a preacher's approach to sin: 
redemption cannot be preached without acceptance of the existence of sin.63 If there 
is no problem, there is no science. The aim of science is to establish truth, in the 
57  From 1923 onward the members of the Vienna Circle advocated logical positivism, accepting only 
analytical statements and those that could be tested by means of perceptual experience as 
scientific – Mautner Dictionary of Philosophy 646. Science replaced the primacy of religion as the 
ultimate answer to life's questions. 
58  Laudan 1987 Am Phil Q 19. Stafleu 1980 Philosophia Reformata 47 calls his move away from 
logical empiricism a "revolution". Caudill 2011 Pro Rege 4 points out that the idealised view of 
science as an objective enterprise did not take into account the realities of "ambition, persuasion, 
funding bias, or cultural values … personal values, consensus, or institutional gatekeeping". 
59  Popper Conjectures and Refutations 47. 
60  Popper Objective Knowledge 342. Strauss 2004 JNGS 60 labels Popper as a "neopositivist".  
61  Popper Conjectures and Refutations 47-48; Popper Objective Knowledge 343-344, 346. 
62  Popper Objective Knowledge 347. 
63  Settle 1979 Systematic Zoology 521; Strauss 2004 JNGS 63. 
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sense of correspondence with facts,64 although one cannot be absolutely sure when 
it has been found.65 Scientific progress occurs when theories are refuted and new 
ones are proposed – in this way we move closer to the truth, and a higher level of 
verisimilitude or truth-likeness is reached.66 Scientific tradition consists of the passing 
on of theories coupled with a critical attitude, a willingness to question, test and 
even abandon refuted theories.67  
The task of science is twofold: it must theoretically explain phenomena (i.e. make 
the unknown known) and it is then used for prediction or technically applied.68 
Scientific theories must "transcend the empirical instances which gave rise to them", 
otherwise they will merely amount to circular explanations.69 Science can also probe 
the procedure of testing, and theories must be testable. Theories that are easier to 
falsify are also those that are "better testable".70 
In Popper's words: 
The progress of science consists in trials, in the elimination of errors, and in further 
trials guided by the experience acquired in the course of previous trial and errors. 
No particular theory may ever be regarded as absolutely certain: every theory may 
become problematical, no matter how well corroborated it may seem now. No 
scientific theory is sacrosanct or beyond criticism.71  
For Popper the demarcation question, i.e. what type of activity qualifies as science 
and what not, was central. The criterion applied for demarcation is "falsifiability, or 
refutability, or testability".72 This implied that confirmation of a theory is not a 
measure of its scientific status, as confirmations are easily obtained. As a 
consequence, an irrefutable theory is not a scientific theory. Only refutable or 
falsifiable theories (and especially those that are more testable) are scientific. A 
refutable theory is one that is "capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable, 
64  Coletto 2009 Journal for Christian Scholarship 158. 
65  Popper Conjectures and Refutations 56; Settle 1979 Systematic Zoology 524; Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ 4. 
66  Coletto 2009 Journal for Christian Scholarship 158; Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ 10, 11. 
67  Popper Conjectures and Refutations 50. 
68  Popper Objective Knowledge 349. 
69  Popper Objective Knowledge 353. 
70  Popper Objective Knowledge 353, 356. 
71  Popper Objective Knowledge 359-360. 
72  Popper Conjectures and Refutations 37. 
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observations".73 Corroborating evidence should be taken into account only if it is the 
result of a genuine (but unsuccessful) attempt to falsify the theory. Even when 
falsified, some adherents will still uphold a theory by adding ad hoc adjustments or 
re-interpretations that will "save" it from being refuted. This will, however, lead to a 
lowering of the theory's "scientific status".74 
By applying Popper's demarcation criterion, astrology does not qualify as a science 
but as a pseudo-science, as its vaguely formulated predictions are virtually 
irrefutable and are not really predictive. The same applies to Marx's theory of history 
– the added ad hoc adjustments to save the theory from refutation diminish its 
status. The psycho-analytic theories of Freud and Adler also do not qualify as 
science as they simply cannot be tested and "no conceivable human behaviour … 
could contradict them".75 However, they are pre-scientific as they contain useful 
truths and have the potential to develop into scientific theories.76 Although many 
scientific theories originate from myths, the myths themselves are not scientific; 
nobody even attempts to falsify them. Metaphysics and religion would therefore not 
qualify as science. 
Falsifiability as the demarcation criterion should be seen against the background of 
Popper's construction of science: the presumption that problems exist, the realist 
aim of reaching true explanations on an empirical basis, as well as the stimulation of 
the criticism of existing theories.77 Falsification does not occur after one refuting 
observation, but after a "critical mass" of refutations has been recognised.  
For Stafleu, Popper's criterion of falsification is a welcome move away from 
positivism, but 
… is only sufficient to "demarcate" scientific from non-scientific law statements. 
Regardless of how much evidence may "corroborate" a natural law statement, 
acceptance of the statement as law is always a matter of faith. A law statement is 
73  Popper Conjectures and Refutations 39. 
74  Popper Conjectures and Refutations 36-37. 
75  Popper Conjectures and Refutations 37, 38; Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ 4-5. 
76  Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ 6. 
77  Settle 1979 Systematic Zoology 529; Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ 6. 
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ultimately believed to be true, because of convincing evidence supporting it. This 
belief does not prove that the law statement is true, for such proof does not exist.78  
Although he probably never intended the net to be cast so wide, Popper in fact 
opened up the possibility that disciplines that were previously not regarded as 
scientific could now be classified as such. His criterion is, however, still partly 
couched in the language and style of the empiricists, and non-natural sciences still 
do not conform to his criterion.79  
Nevertheless, Popper is criticised for not supplying an exact criterion for the 
conclusive acknowledgement of falsification and consequently the acceptance of a 
new theory. His statement that the abandonment of the old theory in favour of the 
new is a "free decision" may in fact be seen as arbitrary. In addition, most theories 
continue to thrive in the face of anomalies.80 
Popper was also sharply criticised by Thomas Kuhn, who argued that Popper was 
not a naïve falsificationist but may "legitimately be treated as one" as the question 
still remains what falsification is, "if it is not conclusive disproof?"81 He therefore 
suggested an alternative approach. 
Popper denies the existence of a single "scientific method" but states that theories 
can be arrived at in many ways. His approach is a move away from empiricism but 
not a total abandonment thereof, as he states that experience does not determine 
theory but can refute it.82 Unwritten codes exist in the scientific community that 
prescribe which empirical "evidence" and which theory is acceptable.83  
  
78  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 9. Note that the 
term "law" is here applied in the non-juristic sense, as a rule that is true or absolute, as the term 
is used in the natural sciences. 
79  Coletto 2011 Journal for Christian Scholarship 68. 
80  Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ 20-21; Ulen 2002 U Ill 
L Rev 883. 
81  Kuhn "Logic of Discovery" 14, 15. 
82  Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ 6, 8. 
83  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 9. 
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3.3  Science is puzzle-solving w ithin a paradigm 
According to Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996), science is not the series of dramatic 
moments of refutation depicted by Popper. The acceptance of a new theory is 
actually a rare and extraordinary occurrence.84 Kuhn sees science not primarily as a 
series of revolutionary discoveries or great events, but more modestly as puzzle-
solving.85 In the case of a revolutionary discovery, the solution may be hypothesised 
but it is not pre-established. When solving a puzzle, the final picture or desired result 
is known from the outset.86 
Most of the time scientists practice "normal science", which could be described as 
fitting the pieces of a puzzle together.87 "It is normal science … rather than 
extraordinary science which most clearly distinguishes science from other 
enterprises".88 This type of science seldom attracts interest outside the profession, 
as the general public is not interested in working out the finer nuances of a process 
but in the principles underlying the paradigm.89 
He established the concept of a paradigm as a "well-articulated and widely received 
theory" or shared set of beliefs that demand shared educational goals and 
techniques.90 Once a paradigm has been established, the debate on fundamentals 
ceases and the serious and specialised scientific work (or paradigm-articulation) can 
commence, as the acceptance of the paradigm or theory itself still leaves important 
practical questions unanswered.91 
A pre-scientific community has no single, accepted theory or paradigm, but once 
such a theory or paradigm has been accepted the discipline becomes a mature 
science where energy and time are spent on solving the puzzles left by the 
acceptance of the paradigm. Typically, after some time a number of anomalies will 
84  Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 358, Kuhn "Logic of Discovery" 19. 
85  Coletto 2009 Journal for Christian Scholarship 159. 
86  Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 362. 
87  Kuhn "Logic of Discovery" 4-5. 
88  Kuhn "Logic of Discovery" 6. 
89  Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 359-360. 
90  Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 356, 359, Kuhn "Postscript" 177. 
91  Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 356-358, 360. 
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arise and if these accrue, they will lead to a crisis in the scientific community, which 
will result in a brief period of extraordinary science, marked by critical discourse. 
After this, a new theory is accepted as the prevailing paradigm. The process then 
repeats itself.92  
The "abandonment of critical discourse" (not its acceptance, as Popper has it) and 
the acceptance of a single paradigm "marks the transition into a science".93 Later 
Kuhn states that the presence of a paradigm is not decisive, but its nature is. A 
paradigm should identify challenging puzzles, supply clues to their solution and 
guarantee success to the competent.94 The purpose of normal science is to bring the 
current paradigm "into closer and closer agreement with nature".95 
The paradigm also functions as a "dogma", so to speak. Scientific education 
inculcates a specific way of thinking, "viewing the world and … practising science in 
it".96 This is so rigid that only systematic theology may possibly trump it.97  Students 
are presented with a range of givens; since the early nineteenth century science 
textbooks have generally not exposed differing views but presented the "facts" in 
terms of the current predominant paradigm.98 The paradigm determines the 
problems as well as acceptable solutions to them.  Students are dogmatically 
initiated into a discipline and method they cannot criticise or evaluate as they are not 
exposed to alternatives.99 In fact, adherents to old paradigms are hardly ever 
convinced of the merits of a new paradigm. The problem of scientific dialogue is 
nevertheless solved when they are eventually replaced by a new generation.100 This 
new generation then banishes the old textbooks "from the active departmental 
library to desuetude in the general university depository".101 
92  Kuhn "Postscript" 177; Kuhn "Logic of Discovery" 7. 
93  Kuhn Kuhn "Logic of Discovery" 6; Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 352. 
94  Kuhn "Postscript" 180. 
95  Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 300. 
96  Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 349. 
97  Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 350. 
98  Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 350, 351. 
99  Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 351. 
100  Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 348.  
101  Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 352-353. 
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Kuhn distinguishes between "the sciences", the humanities and the social sciences.102 
The arts, humanities and most of the social sciences are similar to pre-paradigmatic 
science, i.e. not yet sciences in Kuhn's view.103 
His theory would leave room for the acceptance of the so-called humanities, or the 
disciplines concerned with human culture, to be classified as sciences. The theory 
itself has, however, been developed from the perspective of and has been 
formulated in the language of the natural sciences. In a discipline like law, where 
jurisdiction-specific binding legal rules are continuously developed by competent 
lawmakers, it is difficult if not impossible to identify a single paradigm or disciplinary 
matrix. It is even more difficult to argue that what legal practitioners or scholars do 
will bring them or their discipline "into closer and closer agreement with nature".  
Kuhn's approach thus reveals a predilection towards the natural sciences and an 
antipathy towards disciplines where no definite "paradigm" can be identified. It can 
be argued that it unintentionally broadens the net of "science" to include a broad 
range of activities, as long as they are performed within a certain paradigm. 
It cannot be stated that Kuhn's theory has been generally accepted. His insistence 
on the exclusivity of a paradigm as the indicator of a mature or true science is called 
a "monomaniac concern with only one single point of view" by Feyerabend,104 who 
also describes this as dogmatic, authoritarian and narrow-minded. Feyerabend even 
states that in effect a "closing of [the scientist's] mind" is required to practise normal 
science.105 Popper describes the normal scientist as "a person one ought to be sorry 
for",106 as opposed to Kuhn's optimistic insistence on the positive role dogma plays 
in science. 
102  Kuhn "Function of Dogma" 350. 
103  Coletto 2011 Journal for Christian Scholarship 72. 
104  Feyerabend "Consolation for the Specialist" 201. 
105  Feyerabend "Consolation for the Specialist" 205. This actually leads to the questioning of how 
competing paradigms originate - Feyerabend "Consolation for the Specialist" 206-207. 
106  Popper "Normal Science and its Dangers" 52. 
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It is submitted that a more precise criterion is needed. The next possibility to be 
investigated is the unconventional, more radical view proposed by a next wave of 
philosophers of science, also referred to as the anarchist stance. 
3.4  Science renders beneficial results 
To a certain extent Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) avoids the question as to what a 
science is. He sometimes distinguishes between pre-scientific suppositions and 
scientific endeavours, but never really provides a clear set of demarcation criteria. 
He was branded an anti-scientist, as he unequivocally rejected the exalted status 
attributed to natural science in most contemporary Western societies. 
He approaches the issue pragmatically. The question is not what science is, but 
"what is so great about science?"107 Science is useful as a method of acquiring 
knowledge, but it should not be seen as the only or best method in which reliable 
knowledge can be obtained. All solutions offered by science should also not be 
accepted as the gospel truth and theories proposed by scientists should not 
automatically be preferred to popular theories.108 
He proposes that the broadest possible range of alternatives should be left open, as 
the emphasis is not on the process but on the result, the impact on society.109 A 
useful judgement should be facilitated, and to get there "anything goes".110 
Feyerabend does not always take up a position with the seriousness one expects, 
and often repudiates earlier statements or explains them away as jest. His declared 
boredom with astrology contrasts with his defence thereof in the face of attacks by 
physicists who deem themselves to be non-superstitious.111 Who knows whether the 
defence was indeed serious or not? 
107  Preston 2009 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feyerabend 27. 
108  Lugg 1977 Can J Philos 769, 771. Coletto 2013 Koers 5 argues that we no longer live in the "age 
of science" or "reason" and that postmodernism has brought with it a measure of distrust in 
"science". 
109  Coletto 2009 Journal for Christian Scholarship 164. 
110  Feyerabend Against Method 23. 
111  Lloyd 1997 Philosophy of Science 401-402. 
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Feyerabend has been severely criticised for his pragmatism, as it has been argued 
that all non-scientists can now question and attack theories they know virtually 
nothing about.112 It has even been stated that the acceptance of the "anything goes" 
principle would eventually lead to the demise or collapse of all demarcation criteria 
for science and technology. This rests on the premise that "anything goes" 
references a value judgement. However, it does not, as Feyerabend regards some 
theories as better than others, and notes that (even) radical anarchists would make 
rational choices once confronted with the options.113 
Preston114 notes that Feyerabend later rejected the idea of "science", stating that it 
was an empty label. He bases this opinion on a quotation to the effect that terms 
like science or art are "temporary collecting-bags containing a great variety of 
product" of varying quality. Being only collecting-bags, they are not necessary for 
reality and can be discarded. Farrell115 disagrees with this interpretation as he, like 
Lloyd and Lugg, constructs Feyerabend's theory more moderately. Feyerabend 
rhetorically proposed the possibility of believing in the Homeric gods, astrology and 
witchcraft, to emphasise their swift and possibly unfounded dismissal by science. He 
held that they should be entertained as part of the "range of possible unique 
circumstances and conditions". This interpretation, which acknowledges that 
Feyerabend retains (a measure of) realism, is based on a broader reading of 
Feyerabend's writings and not merely on selected passages, but Farrell 
acknowledges that Feyerabend's ambiguity and isolated remarks open up the 
possibility for an interpretation such as Preston's. 
Feyerabend thus makes the ultimate move to do away with demarcation criteria. He 
seems to define science as one of the many enterprises that yield interesting or 
useful knowledge. It is less useful to ask how the knowledge was obtained or even 
what it is about than to what extent it can be usefully employed. The problem with 
this approach is that in essence it sidesteps the demarcation question and leaves the 
problem unsolved.  
112  Meynell 1978 Philosophy Quarterly 249.  
113  Lugg 1977 Can J Philos 770. 
114  Preston 1997 Philosophy of Science 424. 
115  Farrell 2001 JGPS 364-367. 
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Numerous other demarcation criteria have been proposed over the years, but it is 
practically impossible to analyse all of them. It is submitted that the next group of 
scholars offers a plausible solution to the problem. 
3.5 Science is abstraction 
Although relatively few South African legal scholars have engaged with the question 
this article addresses, most of those who have done so seem to be in agreement 
that law is a science, as it involves abstraction (or "lifting up") in the sense 
envisaged by a relatively small philosophical school of which the Dutch philosophers 
Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977), Dirk Stafleu (1937-) and the South African Danie 
Strauss (1946-) are proponents.116 The views of these philosophers and their South 
African adherents in the legal fraternity will now be considered. 
Herman Dooyeweerd regards scientific knowledge as a systematic and coherent 
unit.117 He defines science in terms of activity leading to knowledge. However, not 
any thought process will "qualify" as being scientific. What he calls the  naive 
experience of reality or thought involves the observation of reality in an 
undifferentiated way without any theorisation, whilst scientific thinking approaches 
reality within the context of one or a few of the modalities that Dooyeweerd 
identified, and involves the abstraction of reality so perceived.118 The modalities are 
aspects of reality itself and "ways of observing the world in which we live".119 For 
example, should a shipwrecked person who is washed ashore recognise a strange 
tree and seek shelter in its shade, that will be regarded as a naive experience. 
However, if the same person (the subject) studies the same tree (the object) to 
ascertain what its botanical properties are in order to establish how it should be 
116  A number of others have contributed to this debate, but for practical purposes the present 
discussion will be limited to Dooyeweerd, Stafleu and Strauss. For a more comprehensive 
discussion see Coletto 2011 Acta Academica 41-61. 
117  Dooyeweerd Dictaat 57 states that the contribution of legal commentators during the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries was not systematic and lacked a proper philosophical basis ("behoorlijk 
wijsgeerige fundering").  
118  Dooyeweerd Encyclopaedia 23, 26-27. The fifteen modalities are: numeric, spatial, kinematic, 
physical, biotic, sensory, logical, historical, lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, legal, ethical and 
certitudinal (Coletto 2013 TD 7). See Strauss 2006 Journal for Christian Scholarship 61-80 for an 
in-depth discussion of Dooyeweerd's theory of modal aspects. 
119  Coletto 2013 TD 7. 
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classified, the subject is approaching the object and analysing its individual 
properties in a theoretical way, using the biotic modality as the entry point or 
"channel" through which the object is approached.120  
Such an act of abstraction, to "make an aspect into a problem", is theoretical 
thinking.121 The so-called "special sciences" like mathematics, biology and law (which 
Dooyeweerd deems a science as defined) thus approach reality from different 
perspectives and focus on changeable phenomena within a specific modality and 
with that specific point of entry. Each modality and special science deals with the 
cosmos and reality in its own way.122 The human subject distinguishes different 
aspects of an object, examines the object from the antithetic position (i.e. as 
opposed to the logical function of the act of thinking) and synthesises this 
knowledge to form a logical comprehension of the object.123 This also leads to the 
phenomenon of subject-specific terminology.124  
According to the system proposed by Dooyeweerd, the six "lower" or foundational 
modalities relate to nature, where certain laws apply to objects, whereas the nine 
"higher" or more complex modalities represent the normative side of the cosmos. 
Positivised laws in these modalities are referred to as norms. Whereas a law of 
nature states what is, a norm states what should be.125 As the juridical aspect of 
reality or the cosmos is thus defined as a distinct sphere by Dooyeweerd, the 
analysis, abstraction and synthesis of its rules on the one hand and persons and 
things on the other hand will be a science. As the juridical modality falls within the 
normative category, law is regarded as a normative science. 
120  Coletto 2013 TD 7. 
121  Dooyeweerd Encyclopaedia 28. 
122  Dooyeweerd Encyclopaedia 28. Philosophy is not a special science as it considers the totality of 
modalities themselves as well as their coherence. 
123  Van Zyl and Van der Vyver Inleiding 26. The example used is the process to establish what the 
legal function of the object chair would be.  
124  Van Zyl and Van der Vyver Inleiding 33. This construction is subject to the principle of sphere 
sovereignty, which means that every sphere has its own laws and the one cannot be reduced to 
the other. One sphere should also not be absolutised as this would lead to "isms" such as 
historicism, which reduces the entire universe, including law, to an inevitable result of historical 
developments (Van Zyl and Van der Vyver Inleiding 30-31). Whereas sphere sovereignty 
describes the uniqueness of each modality, sphere universality refers to the cohesion of the 
different spheres (Van Zyl and Van der Vyver Inleiding 34). 
125  Van Zyl and Van der Vyver Inleiding 37, Coletto 2013 TD 7. 
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This approach does not distinguish among "social sciences", "humanities" or "natural 
sciences" and avoids the vague distinctions and regular overlaps that characterise 
such a classification.126 
Under the influence of Stoker and Dooyeweerd, Van Zyl and Van der Vyver (writing 
in the 1980s) regard law as a science, as it is knowledge that has as far as possible 
been technically and methodologically verified and systematised or categorised.127  
They distinguish two main categories of science: philosophy and the special 
disciplines.128 Philosophy asks how the cosmos, laws and modalities differ, 
correspond and "hang together", while the special sciences are linked to the 
modalities. The specific sciences abstract a certain modality and focus the enquiry 
on that. In this regard, law as science deals with the juridical laws that create, limit 
and harmonise the power, rights and duties of persons through the principle of 
retribution.  Each modality consists of objects and subjects and the laws they are 
subjected to. The juridical modality entails legal principles and positive law129 on the 
law side, and on the subject side it entails persons, animals, plants, things, etc.130 
In their wake, Van Niekerk states that legal phenomena encountered in the positive 
law are juridically qualified by means of an empirical inductive method and that this 
results in empirical legal notions. The process of classification entails definitions "per 
genus proximum et differentia specificum".131 Through this continuous process of 
abstraction and comparison with the positive law, general notions are developed 
inductively and this leads to the "highest empirical legal notions".132 Although Van 
Niekerk states that he aims to define law and legal science, unfortunately these 
126 Coletto 2013 TD 8, 10-11. 
127  HG Stoker, as quoted by Van Zyl and Van der Vyver Inleiding 25. 
128  Van Zyl and Van der Vyver Inleiding 26-27. 
129  In a technical sense this refers to laws that have been properly promulgated or legal principles 
that have been authoritatively laid down – ie the positive law is the law as it is, as it is laid down 
by the legislator and enforced by the courts. Stoker Aard en Rol van die Reg 9-10 states that it is 
positive law, as it has been positivised by man. A reluctance to question the positive law on 
normative level leads to legal positivism, which should be avoided. 
130  Van Zyl and Van der Vyver Inleiding 28. 
131  Van Niekerk Algemene Regsleer 70. 
132  Author's own translation from Afrikaans. 
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definitions are never supplied, as his discussion ventures into an analysis of 
Dooyeweerd's theory.133 
In 1990 Venter et al describe science as having three characteristics or 
"components" that are constantly and dynamically interacting: abstraction, 
systemisation and reflection.134 These three human capabilities are employed to 
explain reality in a "rational" manner. In the authors' view abstraction implies 
generalisation and the creation of categories, which leads to the need for 
systemisation. Abstraction also leads to creative cognitive functioning and the ability 
to cope with more complex tasks or situations.135 Data that have been extracted 
from reality through abstraction must be systematically organised. This happens 
during the acquisition of knowledge, the verification of knowledge and the 
organisation of acquired and tested knowledge.136 In the last instance reflection is 
the process of thinking and of thinking about thinking, which leads the scientist out 
of the domain of the specific disciplines and into the realm of philosophy, a step they 
regard as inevitable.137 By using these criteria they distinguish between scientific and 
pre-scientific knowledge138 as well as between legal practice and legal science.139 
They conclude that reality, viewed from the juridical perspective, is not 
comprehensively defined by either legal practice or legal theory (as a synonym for 
legal science).140  
Writing independently, LM Du Plessis also states that theoretical knowledge displays 
these three characteristics: it is abstract knowledge, it is systematic and involves 
reflection.141 Although theoretical knowledge of law cannot be empirically verified, as 
law itself is intangible, it is of the utmost importance as it is the map used to 
navigate the law. Due to its nature, theoretical knowledge is universal and not 
133  Van Niekerk Algemene Regsleer 74-96. 
134  Venter et al Regsnavorsing 8, 11. In Afrikaans, the language they wrote in: "abstraksie, 
sisteem/sistematiek en nadenke". 
135  Venter et al Regsnavorsing 9-10. 
136  Venter et al Regsnavorsing 10. 
137 Venter et al Regsnavorsing 11.  
138 Venter et al Regsnavorsing 15-18. 
139 Venter et al Regsnavorsing 18-21. 
140 Venter et al Regsnavorsing 21-22. 
141  Du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 1-5. 
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applied to individual situations.142 Theoretical abstraction is conducted according to 
an intended plan or pattern. This is done by drawing distinctions, making 
classifications, creating classifications or describing distinctive criteria. Those who 
create theories also reflect upon their thought patterns and approaches.143 
Swanepoel144 uses the term "regswetenskap" as a given and it is not clear how or 
whether he distinguishes legal science from the law, although it can be deduced that 
he regards theorising of the law as legal science. In his opinion legal science should 
not be limited to the objective description of legal phenomena, but legal science is 
also normative and should establish the principles that determine the phenomena,145 
echoing Van Niekerk's thoughts.146 
It is clear that "abstraction" is a constant ingredient in these South African legal 
philosophers' proposed view of science. However, no reference to the further 
development of Dooyeweerd's theory by Stafleu and Strauss is found in any of their 
works. In what follows, an attempt will be made to fill that gap. 
Stafleu departs from but also refines the work of Dooyeweerd on demarcation and 
provides a complex yet convincing account of science as a human activity. For him, a 
philosophical theory on science breaks down into three basic and irreducible yet 
related facets.147  
The first is that laws apply to knowing subjects (humans) and objects. Without laws, 
subjects and objects, there is no science. 
Every science worth its name is concerned with laws. These laws are concerned 
either with more or less concrete things, events, signs, living beings, artefacts, 
social communities, etc., or with more or less abstract concepts, ideas, constructs, 
etc.148 
142  Du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 2-3. 
143  Du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 4. 
144  Swanepoel 2007 Regswetenskap en Regsfilosofie 1-2. 
145  Swanepoel 2007 Regswetenskap en Regsfilosofie 24. 
146  Van Zyl, Van der Vyver, Du Plessis, Van Niekerk and Swanepoel were all at one time academics 
in the Faculty of Law at the then Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, known 
at the time for its adherence to the reformed Christian philosophy of Dooyeweerd et al.  
147 Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 5-8. 
148  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 6. 
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Without subjects, there can be no laws and without laws there cannot be subjects. 
Over-emphasis on the subject-side leads to irrationalism and over-emphasis on the 
law-side leads to rationalism. The subject/law distinction is an ontological matter, 
while "the primary aim of science is to render these laws explicit, ie to explicate 
them".149 These a priori laws that exist independent of human intervention should be 
distinguished from human hypotheses, theories or models, which are epistemological 
in nature.150 All knowledge of facts is theory-laden and there is an inescapable 
correlation between subject and law.151  
Secondly he points out the link between typicality and modality. Typical laws apply 
to a certain class of subjects only and are "found by induction and generalization of 
empirical facts or lower-level law statements".152 Modal laws are explanations or 
descriptions of a mode, apply universally and can be formulated only by means of 
abstraction,153 ie rational processes are required. it is not only laws that can be 
distinguished as either typical or modal; the same holds true for subjects and 
objects. A particular wave may be typical, but the "wave packet" does not exist in 
the real sense of the word: it is an abstracted concept, yet exists nonetheless. Thus 
he regards abstraction as an aim of science. Abstraction can entail "the formulation 
of modal, universal laws", but it also includes "modal analysis of concrete reality on 
both the law side and the subject side".154 
Science studies the relationship between subjects and objects in modal terms. The 
"reconstruction or synthesis of typical laws" is the next aim of science. This facet is 
characterised by abstraction and subsequent reconstruction as well as analysis and 
synthesis.155  
149  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 8. 
150  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 9. 
151  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 10. 
152  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 12. 
153  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 11-12. 
154  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 12. Also see 
Stafleu 1981 Philosophiae Reformata 165-167. 
155  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 13-14.  
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In the third instance he argues that a range of irreducible modal aspects exist. All 
modalities exist at once, intertwined and interrelated.156 Science designates and 
distinguishes modal aspects and explores their retrocipations and anticipations, as 
described by Dooyeweerd.157 "Science" occurs when modalities are "opened up", and 
that happens once they are recognised as principles of explanation and their 
retrocipations and anticipations are explored.158 This is what Kuhn refers to as 
revolutionary science,159 but Stafleu proposes the following reformulation of Kuhn's 
theory: 
In the pre-paradigm phase, scientists are not yet aware of the meaning of their 
concepts. With the formation of the first paradigms, it is mainly the retrocipatory 
analogies of the modal aspects or typical structures that are discovered (this 
includes the search for objectivity…). Paradigm change is brought about by the 
discovery of either a new retrocipatory analogy or, even more spectacularly, by the 
discovery of an anticipatory analogy. Such discoveries are made possible by an 
increasing degree of abstraction and, simultaneously, the opening up of new typical 
structures, both theoretically and technically.160 
The effect of this complex demarcation criterion is that a vast range of activities is 
recognised as scientific, but due to his focus on the natural sciences, it is uncertain if 
Stafleu himself regards disciplines other than those traditionally regarded as natural 
sciences as being scientific.161 Nevertheless, abstraction remains a central feature of 
the demarcation criterion, followed by the formulation and construction of laws. 
Strauss also distinguishes between concrete or entitary abstraction (which is not 
scientific) and modal abstraction (which is scientific).162 Entitary abstraction is 
required for people to make sense of the world. Even children will abstract certain 
parts or features to identity a certain animal as a horse or a cow. By contrast, modal 
abstraction or analysis concerns the aspectual dimension of reality, as opposed to 
156  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 21. 
157  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 18. The 
retrocipations and anticipations are analogies, links or connections between earlier or later 
modalities. 
158 Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 30 - conclusions 
on the law-side of reality can be verified on the subject-side. 
159  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 23-24. 
160  Stafleu 1980 http://www.freewebs.com/stafleu/stafleu_time_and_again_Ch1.pdf 26-27. 
161  Coletto 2011 Acta Academica 55. 
162  Strauss 2001 Journal for Christian Scholarship 29-30. 
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the entitary dimension. To rephrase: modal abstraction deals with the how, entitary 
abstraction deals with the what.163 Strauss explains in his own words that  
[m]odal abstraction entails theoretical analysis and analysis always proceeds on the 
basis of similarities and differences. It is aimed at the identification and distinction 
of data.164 
Due to the nature of scientific thought, making distinctions and theoretical thinking 
will always involve more than one modality. A comparison or analogy is made "when 
what is similar is evinced in what is different".165 Entitary abstraction is not 
scientific;166 only modal abstraction focuses on one particular aspect (or a few, but 
not all) and will "provide access to the analysis of the structures of such entities".167 
In fact, the "only exclusive trait of a science is the specific modal aspect ... through 
which it observes the world".168 
Strauss rejects verifiability as a demarcation criterion because trustworthiness is not 
a feature exclusive to science.169 He similarly rejects method and the distinction 
between knowing subject and studied object as reliable demarcation criteria, as 
"method at most has the role of a servant" in science and because the "subject-
object relation is common to non-scientific human experience as well".170  
It can thus be concluded that abstraction is regarded by this group as the key 
element of science. With the concept of modal abstraction, these philosophers 
provide a demarcation criterion "of both simplicity and solidity",171 but it cannot be 
stated that philosophy of science has now, after centuries, come up with one 
generally accepted view on what science is. It is interesting that the South African 
163  Strauss 2001 Journal for Christian Scholarship 30. For him too (30-31), the special sciences are 
limited to the perspective of one or a few particular aspects of reality, whilst philosophy concerns 
the "foundational coherent interlacement among all aspects of reality". This idea is further 
developed in his major work, tellingly titled Philosophy: Discipline of the Disciplines.  
164 Strauss 2001 Journal for Christian Scholarship 31. Another example would be the typonimical 
classification of plants in biology on the one hand and a concept like growth as a modal function 
on the other, Strauss 2006 Journal for Christian Scholarship 69. 
165  Strauss 2006 Journal for Christian Scholarship 70. 
166  Strauss Philosophy 48. 
167  Strauss Philosophy 49. 
168  Coletto 2013 TD 9. 
169  Strauss Philosophy 46. 
170  Strauss Philosophy 47. 
171  Coletto 2011 Acta Academica 59. 
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legislator has provided such a definition in order to regulate the distribution of 
research funding and the stimulation of research. For the sake of completeness, 
Parliament's contribution to the debate will be considered next. 
4 Statutory provisions in South Arica 
The National Research Foundation (NRF) is the principal public institution for funding 
and promoting scientific endeavours in South Africa.172 In section 1 of the National 
Research Foundation Act173 research, science and technology are defined as follows: 
"research" is the generation, preservation, augmentation and improvement of 
knowledge by means of scientific investigations and methods in the field of science 
and technology; 
"science" includes any system of knowledge attained by verifiable means and the 
organised body of knowledge humans have gained by research; 
"technology" includes indigenous technology, and means knowledge accumulated 
through research or observation, and the practical application thereof.174 
The Human Sciences Research Council Act175 defines human sciences as 
… the investigation of human life and society through systematic, rational and 
verifiable methods that recognise the validity of both objective and subjective 
data.176 
The definition of research in this Act is a verbatim repetition of the definition in the 
National Research Foundation Act.177 There are no definitions of "scientific method", 
172  The National Research Foundation Act 23 of 1998 s 3 provides that its purpose is to "support and 
promote research through funding, human resource development and the provision of the 
necessary research facilities in order to facilitate the creation of knowledge, innovation and 
development in all fields of science and technology, including indigenous knowledge, and 
thereby to contribute to the improvement of the quality of life of all the people of the Republic". 
173  Human Sciences Research Council Act 23 of 1968. 
174  S 1 of the National Research Foundation Act 23 of 1998. Prior to the enactment of the present 
definition in 2001 (the previous definition of "science" was replaced by s 19 (f) of the Science 
and Technology Laws Amendment Act 16 of 2011) the definition of science followed a totally 
different approach. It read: "science' includes the natural sciences, engineering sciences, medical 
sciences, agricultural sciences, social sciences and humanities". 
175  Human Sciences Research Council Act 17 of 2008. 
176  Human Sciences Research Council Act 17 of 2008: section 1. Prior to 1990, the Afrikaans version 
of the Human Sciences Research Act 23 of 1968 included "regswetenskap" in the definition of 
human sciences, whereas the English version simply referred to "law". After the promulgation of 
the Human Sciences Research Amendment Act 99 of 1990, human sciences were broadly defined 
in s 1 as "those sciences concerned with the study of the creations and the manner of mental 
activity of man, human development, or mutual relationships, institutions or conditions in 
society". The entire Human Sciences Research Act 23 of 1968 was repealed in 2008 and replaced 
by the Human Sciences Research Council Act 17 of 2008.  
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"scientific investigations", "verifiable means", "systematic, rational and verifiable 
methods", "objective data" or "subjective data" in either of these Acts.  
The definitions of "research" and "science" in these Acts are linked to and 
reminiscent of the (philosophically abandoned) positivist approach, due to the 
references to a verifiable or scientific method. The lack of a definition of such a 
method is glaring. However, the notion that science is a body of knowledge 
accumulated by means of defined activities is repeated. 
On its official website the Human Sciences Research Council states that it "conducts 
research that generates critical and independent knowledge relative to all aspects of 
human and social development" and lists a number of research areas, but none of 
these directly include law.178 On its official website, where guidelines for research 
awards are provided, the NRF provides assistance and widens the scope of the 
activities that are regarded as "research" for its purposes: 
For purposes of the NRF, research is original investigation undertaken to 
gain knowledge and/or enhance understanding. 
Research specifically includes   
• the creation and development of the intellectual infrastructure of subjects and 
disciplines (e.g., through dictionaries, scholarly editions, catalogues and 
contributions to major research databases);  
• the invention or generation of ideas, images, performances and artefacts where 
these manifestly embody new or substantially developed insights; and 
• building on existing knowledge to produce new or substantially improved 
materials, devices, products, policies or processes. 
• It specifically excludes: 
• routine testing and analysis of materials, components, instruments and 
processes, as distinct from the development of new analytical techniques; and 
177  National Research Foundation Act 23 of 1998 
178  HSRC 2013 http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/research-outputs. The research areas listed are: 
Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery; Economic Performance and Development; 
Education and Skills Development; HIV, AIDS, STIS and Tuberculosis; Human and Social 
Development; Population Health, Health Systems and Innovation; Centre for Science, 
Technology and Innovation Indicators.  
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• the development of teaching materials and teaching practices that do not 
embody substantial original enquiry.179 
Legal academics receive funding from the NRF and are voluntarily graded according 
to the Foundation's criteria. The list of rated researchers recognised by the NRF 
includes more than 100 researchers who have "law" in one or other sense as their 
field of specialisation.180 All of these researchers hold posts at universities or are 
retired academics. 
 However, the question remains whether or not law qualifies as a science for the 
purposes of the statutory definitions. It is not clear that law (or any other discipline 
for that matter) is a human science in terms of the current definition, as the 
definition is vague. Clarification of the terms "objective" and "subjective" (data) is 
required. In addition, the reference to "life and society" as the object that is studied 
or observed though the use of verifiable, rational, systematic methods does not 
contribute to denoting an activity as scientific. This could just as easily hold true for 
poetry, art, journalism or the making of financial investments. 
Is the body of knowledge called "law" then a science as such? It can be accepted 
without any fear of contradiction that law is a system of knowledge and that it forms 
part of the organised body of knowledge humans have gained, but the question is 
whether this was achieved by means of "verifiable means" or through "generation, 
preservation, augmentation and improvement of knowledge by means of scientific 
investigations and methods in the field of science and technology".  
These terms have not been judicially considered yet, but the definitions cannot be 
ignored or disregarded due to the mere fact that they do not conform to 
contemporary thinking, as they remain legally enforceable. However, it is submitted 
that the statutory provisions and philosophy of science can be usefully aligned to 
offer a workable demarcation criterion, even if limited to the South African context. 
  
179 NRF 2014b  http://www.ul.ac.za/research/application/downloads/Assessment%20procedure% 
20for%20NRF %20Awards_ February%202014.pdf 3. 
180  NRF 2014a http://www.nrf.ac.za/document/rated-researchers-pdf, list published on 5 February 
2014. 
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5 Suggested approach 
It is proposed that the demarcation criterion proposed by Strauss and others, modal 
abstraction, can be used to constructively interpret the statutory definitions. 
According to the legislation, research is the activity that generates scientific 
knowledge. Modal abstraction as an intellectual mode of thinking described by 
Strauss et al can be regarded as an activity that develops "subjects and disciplines," 
that embodies "new or substantially developed insights" and builds on existing 
knowledge to substantially improve or create new "materials, devices, products, 
policies or processes". It is submitted that this will offer a useful and flexible 
standard whilst providing new meaning to the term "scientific method". 
To summarise: 
(a) Scientific thinking, as an action, can be satisfactorily characterised by modal 
abstraction. It is theoretical, artificial thinking that identifies problems through 
the lens of a particular modality, in the present case the juridical.  
(b) Modal abstraction is used to provide (or suggest) answers to the problem at 
hand, by using analysis, analogies and synthesis. In other words, some original 
work is done or some development or refinement of theory is achieved. This 
activity has been labelled "research" by the legislature. 
(c) The body of work resulting from scientific thinking makes up the (special) 
scientific discipline, in this case "law", consisting of subjects, objects, norms 
and theories. 
It is clear that "science" is the result of performing a defined activity. Even in his 
early published work, Strauss refers to law as a science,181 but he readily 
acknowledges that not all activities within the legal field are scientific. He employs 
the example of a judge preparing a verdict. Although the verdict may be arrived at 
systematically, it does not necessarily amount to a "legal scientific treatise".182 It 
seems as if an ontological shift has been made by philosophers of science, who 
181  Strauss Wysbegeerte en Vakwetenskap 59. 
182  Strauss Philosophy 46. 
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initially referred to science as a thing (eg "biology is a science") but who have 
recently defined science in terms of the type of activities performed by those 
involved. It follows that the various activities of those involved in the discipline of 
law in various capacities, as already referred to in sections 2 and 3 above, should be 
considered to ascertain if any of them qualifies as scientific, in order to answer the 
central question posed in this article.  
6 (When) Are lawyers then practicing science?  
The term lawyer is used here as a generic description of any person who has 
received legal training and occupies him- or herself with the law. In South Africa the 
two legal professions, i.e. those of advocate and attorney, are regulated by statute, 
and strict professional codes apply.183 However, a significant number of those who 
hold law degrees earn their living in different capacities that are just as essential in 
society and to the legal system. They include public prosecutors, legal advisers in 
state departments or commercial entities, magistrates, judges, mediators, members 
of tribunals or boards, and legal academics. 
Divergent activities are at stake: the first encounter is normally when a student 
learns about (the theory of) law, which encounter is usually followed by a period of 
learning how to practice law (in whichever capacity, regardless of whether it is as an 
attorney, advocate, public prosecutor, legal adviser, state official or administrative 
officer). Then follows a period of actually applying the theoretical knowledge and 
practical skills acquired to solve problems or assist clients or the public (paying or 
not). Some start teaching or sharing what they know, whether it is theoretical 
knowledge or practical skills and knowledge gained from experience. When disputes 
are settled by courts of law, legal rules and principles are considered and applied by 
magistrates and judges. New legal rules are created when judges offer a new 
183  The Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 and the Admission of Advocates Act 74 of 1964. Although the 
professions are due to be restructured, the Legal Practice Bill B20-2012 also contains provisions 
on the regulation of practitioners (Ch 3) and professional conduct (Ch 4). The bill is currently 
being debated in the National Assembly and has been in the making for over 10 years. For a 
history of and divergent views on the Bill see the entire De Rebus April 2013. Professional bodies 
do not shy away from disciplining and even excommunicating errant members. Examples 
abound. Recent incidents include inter alia General Council of the Bar of South Africa v Geach 
2013 2 SA 52 (SCA); Mda v Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2012 1 SA 15 (SCA). 
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interpretation or when a solution to a new problem is fashioned by applying existing 
principles in a novel way.184  
In essence students are learning about the law and what law is. In Strauss's terms, 
they are acquainting themselves with the entities (rules, subjects, objects) within the 
juridical sphere. They are "learning to count using the abacus".185 In South Africa, 
the importance of the possession of general academic and legal skills in this process 
is recognised, and all tertiary qualifications include both knowledge and skills 
outcomes.186 Gradually students will start disregarding irrelevant detail and focus on 
the juridical aspect within a given situation, ie they will engage in theoretical 
thought. The skills gained will also be used to solve problems and formulate 
arguments. This is probably how the undergraduate student (or those doing their 
first legal degree) would function.187 Once students identify and distinguish the 
characteristics of objects (persons, concrete situations) and laws (legal norms), they 
are entering the scientific arena, probably at master's level.188  
The doctoral student, for whom the ability to "conceptualise new research initiatives 
and create new knowledge or practice" and "develop new methods, techniques, 
processes, systems or technologies in original, creative and innovative ways 
appropriate to specialised and complex contexts" are amongst the required 
competencies,189 will definitely perform scientific work, as modal abstraction will be 
used to develop legal theory or refine current theory, thus adding to the body of 
legal knowledge.  
184  In accordance with the doctrine of precedent (stare decisis), judgements on points of law by a 
High Court or court of higher stature will in principle be binding on courts within that jurisdiction.  
185  Strauss Philosophy 48. 
186  Campbell 2014 Stell LR 16-17, 19-21, 22-25, 29-30. The author provides a cogent exposition of 
the divergent demands of the organised legal professions and academia and concludes that the 
balance between theoretical and skills education is a matter that all law schools in the world 
grapple with in respect of their first or general legal qualifications. Legal qualifications up to LLB 
(NQF level 8) are general legal qualifications that prepare graduates for varied career paths. 
187  SAQA 2012 http://www.saqa.org.za/docs/misc/2012/level_descriptors.pdf Level Descriptors for 
NQF levels 5 to 8, 8-11. 
188  SAQA 2012 http://www.saqa.org.za/docs/misc/2012/level_descriptors.pdf Level Descriptor for 
NQF level 9, 11-12; Campbell 2014 Stell LR 21. 
189  SAQA 2012 http://www.saqa.org.za/docs/misc/2012/level_descriptors.pdf Level Descriptor for 
NQF level 10, 12. 
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The learning process is thus a continuum, starting from a position of pre-scientific 
thinking that is gradually developed into scientific thinking and then the culmination 
of such thinking in the creation of new knowledge, or the development of existing 
theory.  
This process is facilitated by legal academics, who teach law, provide mentorship 
and undertake research in law.190 Legal research is an activity mainly characterised 
by literature studies191 on problematic issues and the formulation of proposed 
solutions to specific problems. Options are analysed, arguments are considered and 
the theoretically justified proposed solution is published as an article in an accredited 
journal, a book, a report or a conference paper. The "clients" who are served with 
the results of this research are members of a varied group comprising practising 
professionals, the judiciary, the state administration, fellow academics and those 
concerned with reforming the law or politics. These "clients" expect assistance from 
the legal academic to "perform their functions ... more efficiently or more 
effectively".192 Their expectations are based on the "conviction that such research 
can be made beneficial to the administration of justice" in the sense that it can lead 
to law reform.193 It can be stated that the task of an academic is that of a 
...feedback mechanism[s] for error correction and truth propagation ... At a 
minimum, the legal academy points up logical or empirical flaws. At its best, this 
knowledge system provides both the grounds for understanding the (legal) world 
and the conditions for offering new and better ways of being in that world.194 
190  Twining 1974 Brit J L & Soc'y 151. On 153 the author states: "...[t]o [academics in other 
disciplines] academic lawyers often appear to be some kind of hybrid technologist, concerned 
with an applied subject which hovers rather uneasily on the fringes of the worlds of the social 
sciences and the liberal humanities". It is a general phenomenon that academics may either be 
practice- or academically orientated (Campbell 2014 Stell LR 24), but this does not detract from 
the fact that universities require academics to teach and do research.  
191  Although other methods such as empirical studies are accepted and may also be used, literature 
studies (including comparative studies) are most prevalent. This assertion is based on the 
author's personal experience. No empirical or verifiable research on the extent of use of either 
research method has been published. 
192  Twining 1974 Brit J L & Soc'y 151. The author (on 151-152) notes that in the United Kingdom 
the needs of legal practice and commercial viability dictate choices on what is taught or 
published by legal academics, a matter that may well be the topic of a separate discussion. 
193  Cairns 1935 Philosophy of Science 485. The author incidentally argues that for this very reason, 
legal research amounts to a "technology" and will not be a science as long as this ideal prevails 
(Cairns 1935 Philosophy of Science 487-488). 
194  Woolman 2010 SAPL 527. 
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The task of the academic is to step back and suggest "how a body of law hangs 
together" or if it doesn't, why not. Woolman uses the apt image of academics 
offering "the intellectual scaffolding on which to build a better – a more just – legal 
system".195 The role of the academic lawyer is limited in the creation of new law, but 
needed in the continuous dialogue between lawmakers, practitioners, academics and 
the public.196 The legal academic plays a vital part in what he calls theory building, as 
academics may offer the courts critical reflection on the coherence of theories while 
not being constrained by time pressure, or the demands of clients, formal courtesy 
or collegiality.197  
Smits states that the primary task of the legal academic is to answer the normative 
question of what law ought to be. Alternative outcomes may be suggested and may 
be viable, depending inter alia on the particular legal tradition.198 
When a legal academic unlocks new knowledge or creatively re-exposes or 
reinterprets existing knowledge as described above,199 the activity will be scientific, 
as it complies with the criteria of modal abstraction and the creation of new 
knowledge or the development of existing theory. It goes without saying that a mere 
summary of existing principles or a compilation of applicable rules will not be a 
scientific activity; a view supported by the legislature.200 
The distinction between legal practice and legal science made by the authors 
Langdell, Van Warmelo and Du Plessis, as well as the South African courts and 
legislature,201 may be justified with reference to the demarcation criterion proposed 
in section 5, but it is submitted that it cannot be stated that legal practitioners never 
engage in scientific activities. To state that the activity is not scientific when the 
practitioner is doing rather than thinking is an oversimplification.202 Practitioners also 
195  Woolman 2010 SAPL 527 fn 15. 
196  Woolman 2010 SAPL 521, 534, 539. 
197  Woolman 2010 SAPL 543. 
198  Smits 2014 Critical Analysis of Law 76, 82, 85-86; Smits "Redefining Normative Legal Science" 
49-51, 54; Smits 2012 http://elgarblog.wordpress.com/2012/08/15/what-do-legal-academics-do. 
199  Du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 11. 
200  As discussed in s 4. 
201  As discussed in s 2. 
202  Venter et al Regsnavorsing 19. Thinking is, after all, also a form of doing. 
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think about and reflect upon the personality traits of their clients and the particular 
strategy that should be adopted in a particular matter, but that does not amount to 
modal abstraction. The mere application of rules and principles learnt as a student 
and through experience will amount to entitary abstraction, not modal abstraction, 
and will not develop existing theory or add to the existing body of knowledge.  
However, the legal system would have remained stagnant if not for those 
practitioners who actually rethink existing approaches (with or without the input of 
academics) and have the courage to convince their clients to pursue litigation in 
order to bring about legal reform, based on their proposed reinterpretation of 
existing rules and theory arrived at through modal abstraction. To state that legal 
practitioners are never practising science would be to disregard the undeniable 
impact the legal counsel of a Ms Carmichele203 or Ms Fourie204 had on the 
development of legal theory in South Africa.  
Similarly, judicial officers will always engage in entitary abstraction during 
adjudication but will also engage in modal abstraction when a judgement is written, 
and will contribute towards the development of legal theory where a legal norm is 
reinterpreted or developed. all of these activities correspond with those Stafleu 
associates with the "opening up" of a modality. 
The demarcation criterion proposed in section 5 can therefore be successfully 
utilised to analyse the activities of different categories of persons who are trained as 
lawyers.  
  
203  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 
4 SA 938 (CC) changed the approach to the determination of state liability (and more particularly 
the test for unlawfulness) for omissions of its servants where citizens' fundamental rights are 
infringed. See Van der Walt 2003 SAJHR 517-540. 
204  Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs 2003 5 SA 301 (CC) reconsidered the common law rule that 
marriage is concluded between a man and a woman, which led to the legal recognition of same 
sex unions, see Schafer 2006 SALJ 626-647. 
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7 Conclusion 
The analysis of South African legislation, jurisprudence and contemporary philosophy 
of science in this article has demonstrated that the type of activity a person is 
engaging in would be the determining factor to answer the question of whether or 
not law is science. The demarcation criterion proposed here, which is in essence an 
alignment of the criterion proposed by Strauss and others and the applicable 
statutory definitions, has been used to demonstrate that lawyers may be practising 
science, depending on the activity involved. 
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